INTRODUCTION
T he unemployment insurance (UI) program was created in 1940 in the shadow of the Great Depression and has since become one of the federal government's largest social security programs. The liberalization of the program in 1971 and the subsequent growth in UI expenditure generated a considerable policy debate in Canada. This debate has occurred on two fronts: the labour market implications of the program and the redistributive effects of UI. Concern about the program's redistributive effects can be further categorized into a debate on whether UI should be an insurance-oriented program or whether it should be treated as a social (and hence redistributive) program. While many studies have examined the labour market aspects of unemployment insurance, few have considered, empirically at least, the income distribution aspects of the program. This paper examines the immediate impact that unemployment insurance benefits have on family income inequality in the Canadian provinces and at the national level. The paper also provides a measure of the welfare gain from the reduction in 540 Galen J. Countryman CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXV, NO. 4 1999 inequality resulting from unemployment insurance benefits. This will provide policymakers with a means to compare the efficiency costs of UI with the equality enhancing effects of the program.
Income inequality measures were calculated for the period 1975 to 1996 using microdata on economic families from Statistics Canada's Survey of Consumer Finances. The measures were calculated first using total family income (which includes all earnings, investment income, government transfers, and other income) and then with total income excluding unemployment insurance benefits. The exclusion of UI benefits from total income led to a rise in income inequality in all provinces in all years suggesting that, leaving regional issues aside, UI is an equality enhancing program for all provinces. The magnitude of the increase in the income inequality measures reflected the level of unemployment in each province and the use of UI in each province. Provinces where UI benefits constituted a larger percentage of income exhibited greater increases in income inequality when benefits were removed. The analysis indicates that there are substantial immediate distributional benefits from the program. In addition, a standard approach for measuring the cost of inequality indicates the reduction in inequality from UI would be worth between 1 and 2 percent of aggregate income. I also briefly examined the share of benefits and contributions for each province, using separate data from Statistics Canada's Unemployment Insurance Statistics.
Admittedly, the contribution of this paper is limited by the fact that it only considers the redistributive impact of UI benefits and does not account for the redistributive impact of premiums and the tax system used to finance the unemployment insurance program. Nor does it consider the behavioural implications that the removal of UI would have on families. In addition, while much of the literature considers the effects of specific UI reforms (marginal changes), this paper focuses on the overall effects of the program through time. Some may feel that, since UI is granted on an individual basis, individuals should be the economic unit under study. However, the choice of economic families allows us to consider the impact of the program at the family level, which is an approach also taken when considering the labour market implications of the program (e.g., when considering effects on secondary earners).
The next section briefly summarizes the literature on the UI program's redistributive effects. The third section describes the methodology of the study while section four reviews the results. Section five concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW ON INEQUALITY EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Two studies done for the Economic Council of Canada (Cloutier 1978; Kapsalis 1978) provide some insight into the effects of UI on income redistribution. Both of these studies evaluated the program using family, rather than individual, income. Taken together, these two studies summarize the debate on whether the program should be primarily an insurance or an income security (and hence redistributive) program. Cloutier (1978) provides a comprehensive study of not only UI but also other social security programs for the years 1971 to 1975. He accounts for the effects of the tax system in conjunction with UI using quintile shares to assess the impact on income inequality. Cloutier concluded that unemployment insurance was redistributive on a net basis, but that inequities were generated by benefits going to second income earners in some families but not in others. Meanwhile, Kapsalis (1978) argued that the UI program is not altogether different from private group insurance plans that are in existence. Therefore, in his study, Kapsalis treated the program as though it were a private insurance scheme and estimated cost ratios to see if some families undercontributed or overcontributed to the program. He concluded that there were no major inequities in the program when examined in this way.
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CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXV, NO. 4 1999 Some researchers have also examined the potential impact that reforms to the UI program may have on income inequality. Osberg (1979) attempted to predict the effects of the 1979 UI amendments on income inequality. He argued that the tightening of the program would adversely affect income inequality, mainly because of the increase in minimum eligibility requirements. In response to political pressures from rising unemployment, the government reversed the changes made to minimum eligibility requirements in 1981. This makes an evaluation of his hypothesis difficult, given the short time span.
More recently, Erksoy, Osberg and Phipps (1995) used simulation analysis to generate changes in inequality due to various reforms of the UI program. They concluded that an increase in the entrance requirement or a reduction in the benefit rate would increase income inequality, while an increase in maximum insurable earnings would decrease inequality. These factors led them to observe that income inequality increases as the UI program becomes more restrictive. In a subsequent paper, Osberg, Erksoy and Phipps (1998) evaluated the welfare effects of unemployment insurance. They argued that UI increased welfare by increasing economic security, which was, in their view, more important to low-income individuals. They simulated the welfare effects of UI under the 1971 and 1994 systems. They found that the lower deciles of the income distribution experienced the greatest welfare loss under the 1994 system compared to the 1971 system. The simulation papers are useful in that they are able to separate the effects of policy changes on UI and inequality from the effects of the general economic environment. However, they do not provide an empirical assessment of the actual impact that UI has had on inequality. While this paper uses an empirical approach, the results cannot be easily separated into the effects of policy changes versus changes in the economy.
There are two recent studies that examine income inequality at the provincial level. Rashid (1998) used census data to look at family income inequality at the national and provincial levels between 1970 . Finnie (1998 examined individual earnings inequality at the provincial level for the period 1982 to 1994 using data from the Longitudinal Administrative Databank. Both studies found that inequality rose during the period. These studies differ from this study in that earnings inequality, which is the subject of Finnie's paper, is only one component of total income inequality, while Rashid uses different definitions of families as well as different data. Therefore the results will not necessarily match those found here.
METHODOLOGY
This study evaluates the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on income inequality first by examining decile shares and then by using three inequality measures: the Gini coefficient, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD), and the MLD's ordinally equivalent cousin in the Atkinson (1970) family of indices. All three of these indices are scaleindependent and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton Condition of Transfers where a progressive transfer from a rich person to a poor person reduces the level of inequality. The Gini coefficient is the most common measure used in the inequality literature. However, it is not transfer sensitive. 1 Therefore, the Gini is reported here not so much for analytical purposes, but to provide readers who are unfamiliar with the MLD with another commonly used inequality measure for comparison. The mean logarithmic deviation was derived by Theil (1967) and is part of the Generalized Entropy family of inequality measures. The index is calculated using the following formula:
where N is the number of families, µ is the average income and y i is the income per economic family. The MLD is transfer sensitive. The MLD's ordinally equivalent cousin in the Atkinson (1970) family is also used. It is calculated using the following formula: 
The advantage of using the Atkinson measure is that it is based on a social welfare function which is the utilitarian set with utility being logarithmic in income. 2 The choice of the MLD which places more weight on lower incomes also allows for an interesting contrast with the Gini coefficient, which places more weight on the middle of the income distribution. As the results show, the differences are quite stark indeed. This is evident not only through the differences in how the two measures rank the various provinces but how the two indices measure the redistributive impact of the unemployment insurance program.
Microdata tapes from Statistics Canada's Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the following 17 income years were used: 1975, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984-96 (inclusive) . 3 The economic unit chosen was the economic family, which is defined by Statistics Canada as two or more individuals living in the same dwelling who are related by blood, marriage or adoption. Since computation of the MLD requires incomes to be positive, all observations where total income was zero or less were excluded. In addition, for the purposes of confidentiality, Statistics Canada places all families with exceptionally high incomes or who have other distinctive characteristics in a "special families" category, since a geographical breakdown would lead to their likely identification. Therefore these observations were excluded. Since most of these observations are in the right tail of the income distribution, and account for a small percentage of the population, this should not impact greatly on the calculations. 4 Total family income before taxes and deductions is used as the initial basis for evaluating income inequality. Unemployment insurance benefits are then deducted from total income to generate total income excluding UI benefits, thus creating two income distributions to evaluate income inequality. The first and most obvious drawback of this approach is that the simple removal of UI benefits does not create a hypothetical world without unemployment insurance. One should also account for the premiums as well as any general tax revenues that finance the program. Unfortunately, the SCF does not have data on the amount of premiums paid per family. The addition of the income tax effects further compounds the computation of the distributional impact of the program's sources of funding. One also cannot easily account for the effects that the removal of UI would have on other programs, such as social assistance which would also have distributional implications. Therefore, it is assumed that the financing of the program has little effect on relative incomes.
A second drawback to the study is that there is no accounting for possible changes in people's behaviour when UI benefits are taken away. This is obviously not the case: many families will attempt to mitigate the loss in income whether through other employment or social assistance. However, Phipps (1990) suggests that the labour market behavioural responses will be small. A more thorough discussion of this issue is left until after the results.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON THE INEQUALITY EFFECTS OF UI
The discussion of the results will begin with an overview of the importance of unemployment insurance in Canada, and which provinces depend on it most heavily. The importance of UI benefits on the income distributions of the provinces and nationally is evaluated first by examining decile shares of income including UI benefits versus income excluding UI benefits and then by looking at the inequality indices. A discussion of the welfare effects from the reduction in inequality due to UI benefits finishes the section. under-reporting and the use of a reduced sample, the figures presented are significantly less than what was actually spent on a National Accounts basis. 5 Nevertheless, it is quite striking that expenditure on UI benefits was close to $1,400 per economic family in Canada in 1992.
Tables 2 and 3 also present the sharp contrast in UI use between provinces as well as between years of high and low unemployment. The unemployment rate for Canada was 7.5 percent in 1989 and 11.3 percent in 1992. There is a much heavier reliance on the program in the provinces east of Ontario while there is a marked lack of importance in the provinces west of Quebec. In Newfoundland, almost half of all economic families had at least one member receiving unemployment insurance benefits in 1992, while only 17.6 percent of families received benefits in Saskatchewan. The actual amounts paid also follow the same pattern. One can easily see the effects of recessions on UI use in the western provinces, where the percentage of families receiving UI is significantly higher in 1992 than in 1989. Naturally, one would expect the program to make a larger contribution to total income in provinces with higher unemployment as well as during years of high unemployment. Table 4 presents the average family incomes and relative importance of UI benefits and employee premiums for the provinces in 1992. The average incomes are based on the SCF sample used in the study, while the benefit and premium values are based on data from Statistics Canada's Unemployment Insurance Statistics. The "per family" values are calculated by using the actual values divided by the number of families in the SCF sample. These results are therefore overstated in absolute terms, but they are merely for illustration. The unemployment insurance program is thought to have redistributive effects among the provinces. Table 4 suggests that the provinces that receive relatively more benefits per family tend to have the lowest average family incomes when benefits are excluded. This in turn means that the spread between the poorest provinces and richest provinces narrows after UI benefits. In Table 4 , the poorest province when benefits are excluded (Newfoundland) had an average family income that was 69.8 percent of that of the richest province (Ontario) . With UI benefits included, the average family income of the poorest province (PEI) is 75.2 percent of the average family income in the richest province.
One can also look at the redistributional affects by using data on total employee contributions to UI. As there is little variation in the relative shares in provincial benefits and contributions over time, only the results for 1992 are shown in Table 4 . The eastern provinces, especially Quebec and Newfoundland, are the biggest net gainers from the program. Ontario and the Prairie provinces typically are net contributors. British Columbia was a net beneficiary during the 1980s, but was a net contributor in the 1990s. In addition, it is also worth noting that there was less interprovincial variation with regard to premiums per family than benefits per family.
Decile Shares
With this overview in hand, let us take a look at the decile shares based on total income with and without UI benefits. Decile shares were calculated for various years, but there was little variation in the results. Therefore, I shall again refer to the 1989 and 1992 results in my discussion. Results for selected provinces for these two years are contained in the Appendix. Results for the remaining provinces are available upon request from the author.
The typical result for most provinces follows the national pattern. Tables 5 and 6 indicate the decile shares and the average income per decile for Canada for 1989 and 1992 respectively. Values are shown for both total income and total income excluding unemployment insurance benefits. By examining the cumulative decile shares, one can see that the Lorenz Curve for total income including UI benefits lies above the curve of the distribution where UI benefits are excluded for both years. This indicates that income inequality does unambiguously increase The last two columns in Tables 5 and 6 present the average benefit per decile and the percentage of total income accounted for by UI benefits in each decile. There are two ways to interpret the results. The first approach is to look at the relative impact of benefits on average income per decile (i.e., as a percentage of income). The other method is to compare the absolute level of benefits per decile. Not surprisingly, unemployment insurance plays a larger role in the incomes of families in the lower-tomiddle deciles than in the upper deciles on a relative basis. In most provinces, and in most years, the lowest two deciles tend to benefit less than the third through seventh deciles. This reflects the fact that the lowest decile families are often not labour force participants, which is a requirement to be eligible to receive UI. Instead, the lower deciles are composed of welfare recipients, seniors or others who are receiving some form of social assistance. 7 The diminishing role of UI as one moves up the income distribution suggests that the families in the upper deciles have a lower probability of experiencing unemployment, as Lazar (1994) noted. However, since benefits are a percentage of maximum insurable earnings which is based on the average industrial wage, then even if all deciles had the same probability of unemployment the upper deciles would receive relatively less benefits than the lower deciles. In absolute terms, the families in the upper deciles often receive on average an absolute amount of benefits not substantially different from that received by families in the middle deciles. This has led to criticism that the program is not well targeted as a redistribution program. However, this reflects the insurance nature of the program. Furthermore, it is obvious that the removal of the program would more adversely affect the lower to middle deciles than the upper deciles. Therefore, on an absolute basis, UI benefits the upper deciles more than the lower deciles. However, on a relative basis, which is the approach taken in this paper and in most inequality analysis, unemployment insurance is more beneficial to the lower and middle deciles.
MLD and Gini Measures
Family income inequality in Canada appears to remain fairly constant over most of the period. This conclusion is similar to those of Love and Poulin (1991) and Blackburn and Bloom (1993) . However, the level of inequality increased sharply in 1995 and 1996 to the highest levels during the period as indicated by the MLD in Figure 1 and the Gini coefficient in Figure 2 . Both figures show that inequality is higher when UI benefits are excluded from total income.
The percentage difference between the MLD calculated using total income and the MLD calculated when UI benefits were excluded has been computed and expressed as a percentage of the former. While this indicates the magnitude of the change in the index itself, it should not be interpreted as a percentage change in the degree of inequality since the index is not a cardinal measure. The provinces were ranked from one (the province with the least inequality) to ten (the province with the most inequality). Detailed year-by-year results for the provinces and Canada are available from the author upon request. Table 7 presents a quick summary of the findings by indicating the average values, over the years for which data were available, of the MLD and the Gini (and the associated equality ranking) for the ten provinces as well as Canada. First of all, in all provinces, both the MLD and the Gini increased when UI benefits were excluded from total income. One can see that, while the eastern provinces generally have more equal income distributions than their western counterparts when UI benefits are included in total income, the situation changes once benefits are excluded. However, the average values hide much of the variation in inequality over time.
An interesting point about the results is how the Gini ranked the provinces in terms of equality in comparison to the MLD, especially for the
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Income Inequality in Canada, 1975 Canada, -1996 (as measured by the Gini Coefficient) 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1982 1981 1979 1975 Including Benefits 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1982 1981 1979 1975 Including Benefits distribution where UI benefits were excluded from total income. The Atlantic provinces, especially Newfoundland, did not rank as well in this case. The fact that the MLD and the Gini emphasize different parts of the income distribution explains the differences in the results.
Quebec and the Atlantic provinces rely on unemployment insurance more than the rest of the country. Not surprisingly, the inequality indices rose the most when UI benefits were excluded in these provinces. However, both Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island tend to have the lowest family income inequality based on total income in most of the years surveyed. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia also have relatively low inequality in comparison with the western provinces. Quebec, on the other hand, has a higher degree of income inequality than the provinces on the east coast. In fact, in most years it is among the five provinces that have the most inequality when either income definition is used.
In contrast, Ontario and the western provinces are little affected by the exclusion of UI benefits from total income when calculating income inequality. This reflects the relative lack of importance the unemployment insurance program has in these provinces. For instance, the MLD changes less than 5 percent for most years in Ontario and Saskatchewan when UI benefits are excluded. In addition, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia tend to have the most unequal income distributions in the country. Among this group of provinces, Ontario is the exception by having relatively lower income inequality. Indeed, when UI benefits are excluded from income, Ontario on average exhibits one of the most equal income distributions, as Table 7 indicates. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta all exhibit a trend where the difference in the MLD between the two income definitions tends to increase gradually after 1981. Saskatchewan also exhibits the most remarkable trend in income inequality: a sharp decline in the late 1970s and a more subtle decline during the rest of the 1980s. Finnie (1998) found that individual earnings inequality was highest in the Atlantic provinces and lowest in Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. The contrast between his results and those found in this paper can be partly explained by noting the difference in the type of inequality that is being measured. The focus of this paper is on family total income inequality, which takes into account other sources of income such as government transfers and the sharing of income within families. Rashid (1998) examined census families rather than economic families. He also used different data. The Gini coefficients found in his paper were typically lower in absolute value, but some of his trends match those of this paper (the decline in inequality in Saskatchewan for instance). He also shows that inequality in Ontario was relatively low and then relatively high in 1995.
There are two other points worth noting. First, both inequality measures react differently to the exclusion of UI benefits during recessions than during years of low unemployment. The best example is Ontario during the early 1990s. The MLD changes almost 8 percent during these years, much more than its normal change of 2-4 percent. While the Gini does not react as strongly, there is a slight difference from other years. In other provinces where unemployment is much more persistent (such as Newfoundland), one cannot discern any such trend, reflecting the heavier reliance on UI benefits as a source of income.
Second, the change in the Gini coefficient between the two income measures drops between 1994 and 1996 for most provinces. The trend is not as strong with the MLD nor is it very strong at the national level. This result suggests that unemployment insurance was less effective in reducing inequality, especially in the middle of the income distribution. Note that this result occurs after the tightening of the program in 1994 and that unemployment levels were still relatively high (see Table 1 ). This result lends some empirical support to the simulation work of Erskoy, Osberg and Phipps (1995) .
The Welfare Effects of Unemployment Insurance
The use of the Atkinson index provides a means to estimate the welfare gain from reducing inequality through the use of unemployment insurance. The Atkinson measure is equal to the percentage that total income could be reduced and still achieve the same level of social welfare if incomes were equally distributed. In this case, the social welfare function upon which the results are based is logarithmic in income. For instance, for Canada in 1996 the Atkinson index took a value of 0.26187 based on total income and 0.27261 when UI benefits were excluded (see Table 8 ). This means that in the case where total income is considered, the same level of welfare would be achieved with 73.81 percent of total income if it were equally distributed. In the case where unemployment insurance benefits are excluded from income, the same level of welfare could be achieved with only 72.74 percent of income, which indicates a higher level (and cost) of income inequality. 8 Therefore, the difference in the Atkinson measure can be interpreted as a reduction in the cost of inequality from the unemployment insurance program or equivalently, the gain in the equivalent equally distributed income (as a percentage of aggregate income). 9 The results in Table 8 show that the cost of inequality is reduced in the neighbourhood of 1 to 2 percent of total income in most years, with the greatest reductions during the recession of the early 1990s. For 1996, the gain was 1.07 percent (73.81 percent to 72.74 percent) of aggregate income, which is approximately $5.975 billion (in 1996 dollars). This is equal to 54 percent of the total UI payments in 1996. 10 Also notice that the reduction in the cost of inequality was lower than average in 1995 and 1996, suggesting again that the 1994 changes to UI made the program less effective in reducing inequality. As with the inequality measures, the welfare effect varies across the provinces, although the range in the welfare gain is not as widespread as the range of percentage changes in the inequality indices. Figure 3 presents the results for selected provinces. Newfoundland shows the greatest welfare gain from the UI system, where the 
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Reduction in Cost of Inequality Due to UI Benefits (based on Atkinson Index where e=1) 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1982 1981 1979 1975 reduction in the cost of inequality is usually between 4 and 6 percent during the 1980s. In Quebec, where the reliance on UI is somewhat less, the gains are lower, ranging between 1 and 3 percent. In provinces where UI has a less significant impact, the welfare effect is much less. For example, in Saskatchewan and Ontario the cost reduction is usually less than 1 percent.
Another Look at the Assumptions
Before the discussion of the results, reference was made to two important assumptions. The first was that for the hypothetical case of there being no unemployment insurance benefits, the premiums (and the tax revenue) used to finance the program were not eliminated. The second was that there would be no effort made by economic families to mitigate the income loss resulting from the removal of UI benefits. I return now to these assumptions and the effect they have on the robustness of the results.
Unemployment insurance premiums are payroll taxes. An argument has been made that their removal would encourage employers to create more jobs. From an inequality standpoint, the effects of more jobs on family income inequality would depend on what kinds of jobs were created, where they were created, and who got them. Nevertheless, the results in this study indicate that, in general, inequality is lower when unemployment is lower. Since there is a maximum limit on the amount of premiums one has to pay, UI premiums are considered to be regressive. However, this effect is offset somewhat by the progressivity of the income tax system. Therefore, the ability of UI to reduce inequality may be a little overstated. However, since UI was most effective at reducing inequality in provinces where average premiums per family were low and average benefits were high, the effects of premiums are less of a concern.
Some individuals receive sickness, maternity, or other "special" benefits instead of regular benefits meaning that they are unemployed for reasons other than layoff from their employer. In these cases, it is not likely that these individuals would be willing (not to mention unable) to find employment. Thus, the removal of UI benefits may generate greater income inequality, depending on the distribution of these special benefits. In addition, the growth of labour force development initiatives within the UI system means that other beneficiaries are engaged in activities (such as training, launching a selfemployment venture, or participating in either a work-sharing or job-creation program) which they might otherwise not have been. Since the purpose of these programs was to increase the employability of recipients, this may constrain the recipients' ability to mitigate the income loss if benefits were removed. As Lazar (1994) observed, a significant amount of unemployment insurance benefits paid are not in the form of regular benefits. Overall, the share of regular benefits as a percentage of total benefits paid has declined from 85 percent in 1981 to 76 percent in 1994. 11 Unemployment insurance can also have an effect on job search, which was the subject of a review article by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) . Some economists argue that unemployment insurance subsidizes job search, which allows individuals to wait longer to find a better job. Therefore, in the absence of unemployment insurance, an individual may take a lower paying job and not mitigate the loss in income from unemployment over the long term as fully as if there had been UI. Secondly, individuals in seasonal occupations or who expect to return to their previous job after a short period of time may not conduct as intensive a job search as they otherwise would. In addition, if there are other income earners in the family, the individual may not have as great an incentive to search for a job. In fact, the individual may be constrained in his or her search because other members of the family have jobs that restrict family mobility. Furthermore, an unemployed individual may not wish to move the family due to non-monetary factors.
Another option is to apply for social assistance. Since welfare is a means-tested, family income
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based program, this option will be largely unavailable to families in the upper deciles. However, welfare payments are less generous than UI benefits (even though they are better targeted toward the poor). Therefore, while income inequality may fall because high-income families cannot obtain social assistance, it may also rise since families who receive welfare as a replacement for UI will see their incomes fall as well. 12 Finally, individuals could also return to education or become self-employed in response to the loss of UI benefits. Further analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study show that unemployment insurance is a reasonably well-targeted social program, at least on a relative basis, and that it does reduce income inequality within provinces. Within provinces, the lower to middle deciles tend to be more adversely affected by the exclusion of unemployment insurance than the upper deciles. Across provinces, Quebec and the Atlantic provinces tend to rely more on unemployment insurance. Consequently, income inequality rises the most in these provinces when benefits are excluded as a source of income and the welfare gain from unemployment insurance is much greater.
While inequality trends are fairly stable over the period, the sharp rise in total income inequality in 1995 and 1996 should be of concern to those who value income equality across families. Further research needs to be done to determine the reasons for this trend, especially if it continues. With regard to the role of unemployment insurance, the decrease in the change in inequality after 1994 suggests that UI is less effective in reducing the level of inequality than before the 1994 reforms. Nevertheless, this does not discount the program's ability to redistribute income between families and provinces.
The efficiency costs resulting from the labour market implications of the program can be compared to the reduction in the cost of inequality induced by the program as a percentage of aggregate income. The results indicate a benefit of 1 to 2 percent of aggregate income nationally with larger gains in the eastern provinces. These results suggest that there would be a benefit to using the current EI surpluses to decrease income inequality further by enriching the benefits of the program. However, this must be balanced by comparing the potential gain to the cost from any labour market distortions created by the program.
NOTES
This paper is taken from my Master's research project which I completed at the University of Guelph. I would like to thank my advisor, Michael Hoy as well as Louis Christofides for their advice and encouragement; and Jeremy Lise and Bo Wandschneider for their assistance. I also thank the editor and four anonymous referees for their comments on the paper. Any remaining errors are mine. The author presently works in the Department of Finance, Ottawa. The views expressed in this paper should not be interpreted as those of the department. 5 Actual benefits were $10.2 billion in 1989 and $18.6 billion in 1992 on a National Accounts basis (1992 dollars). 6 The Lorenz Curves cross for New Brunswick at the first decile for all the years calculated as well as Newfoundland and PEI on occasion. Nevertheless, all three income inequality measures indicate an increase in income inequality when UI benefits are excluded.
7 See Statistics Canada's publication Income Distribution by Size in Canada, Catalogue No. 13-207 for more information. 8 One can assume that the revenue from premiums and the tax dollars used to pay the benefits is returned to the economy in such a way as to not affect the income distribution. Thus the aggregate income for the two distributions can be considered the same. 9 The equivalent equally distributed income is defined as the amount of income, if distributed equally, that would generate the same level of welfare as the current (unequally distributed) level of income. See Atkinson (1970) for further discussion. 10 The $5.975 billion gain in equivalent equally distributed income is based on the aggregate income of the SCF sample used in the analysis. Similarly, this is expressed as a percentage of total UI benefits in the sample.
11 Another interesting trend is that there are proportionately more special benefit recipients in Ontario and the western provinces than in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces.
12 Another interesting aspect is the effect the removal of the unemployment insurance program would have on federal-provincial finances, since the provinces are responsible for welfare programs, while UI is a federal program. While the provinces do receive money from the federal government to help fund social programs, they will no doubt not appreciate any increase in welfare caseloads. 
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